Iluzoryczne wnioskowania – czyli o zaskakujących konsekwencjach „teorii modeli umysłowych"
Rocznik: 1999 Tom: 5 Numer: 1
The aim if this paper is to present two competing theories of reasoning: the mental logie theory and the mental model theory. According to the mental logic theory, mind is a syntactic device, and mental processes are governed by a set of rules which are equivalent to those known from classical logic. On the other hand, the mental model theory claims that mind works on semantic principles, building mental models of the premises and drawing inferences based on what is represented in such models. One of the results of this process is the existence of specific reasoning "illusions". This paper presents such "illusory inferences" as well as the situations in which they are suppressed. Finally, the place of illusory inferences in building the algorithmic theory of mind and the rationality debate is dealt with.