Array
(
    [id] => 209
    [date] => 2018-11-20
    [doi] => 
    [title] => Jerry’ego Fodora poszukiwanie natury pojęć
    [title_en] => 
    [authors] => Zdzisław Chlewiński
    [abstract] => 
In psychology, there are numerous issues arousing theoretical controversies that stem either from psychological research or from investigations into cognitive science. J. Fodor, an adherent of the representational theory of the mind, treats concepts as the least complex of the psychological beings that show both representational and causal properties. The classical theory of concepts (according to Aristotle or Hume) differs significantly from the contemporary theories – pragmatic in character – of concepts. According to Fodor, what constitutes the difference between both approaches is the "way" in which the notion of concept is constructed. Classical views establish first what the concept is and then what it means to possess this concept; in pragmatic theories, however, these two processes are reversed. This paper presents an analysis of basic theories of concepts in different versions of pragmatism. Fodor's arguments against the explanatory power of specific theories of concepts were specially stressed. Ali notions of concepts provoke serious theoretical controversies, which may have implications for both the basis of the theory of concepts and cognitive science.

    [abstract_en] => 
    [keywords] => science, concepts, Fodor, theory of mind
    [keywords_en] => 
    [file_path] => /files/articles/1999-5-jerryego-fodora-poszukiwanie-natury-poj.pdf
    [okladka] => psychologia_teoretyczna_ogolna_i_metodologia.jpg
    [rocznik] => Rocznik: 1999 Tom: 5 Numer: 1
    [strony] => 31-41
)